British Society for the History of Philosophy
Annual Conference
The Actual and the Possible

16th-18th April 2013
The University of York

MIND

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The BSHP is a Registered Charity (Registered Charity Number 299041)
The conference (apart from the Conference Dinner at King’s Manor) takes place in the Humanities Research Centre, the Berrick Saul Building at The University of York.

Contents of this booklet:

**Conference Programme**
**Abstracts** of the papers presented
**Map** of the York University campus and of King’s Manor
**Blank Pages** for your notes
**Agenda** for the Annual General Meeting
Day 1 (April 16th)

13.00 Registration

14.00 Tom Baldwin (York)
    TBC

15.15 Coffee

15.45 Anna Marmodoro (Oxford)
    ‘Power Gunk’

17.00 John Divers (Leeds)
    ‘Necessity in Quine (and Thereafter)’

18.30 Drinks reception sponsored by:

[Logo: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group]
Day 2 (April 17th)

9.00    Peter Simons (Dublin)
        ‘And Now for Something Completely Different: Meinong’s Approach to Modality’

10.15   Wayne Martin (Essex)
        ‘The Semantics of “Dasein” and the Modality of Being and Time’

11.30   BSHP Management Committee Meeting (over Lunch)

12.00   Lunch

Parallel Session A               Parallel Session B
13.00   Mogens Laerke              Chrissy Meijns
(Aberdeen/ENS Lyon)              (UCL)
‘The Great Confusion: Actualised Essences and Actual Essences in Spinoza’
‘Formal Essences and (Suarez)’

14.00   Stephan Leuenberger
(Glasgow)
‘Wolff on the Necessity of Necessity and the Necessity of Contingency’
‘Capacity and Actuality Megarians’
‘Metaphysics in Theta 3: a Defence of the Megarians’

15.00   Coffee
Day 2 (April 17th)

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Day 3 (April 18th)

9.00 Simo Knuuttila (Helsinki)
‘New Beginnings in Medieval Modal Theory’

10.15 Coffee

10.45 Parallel Session E
Emma Ingla (Madrid)
‘Deleuze on Leibniz's Vagabond Adam: From the Possible to the Virtual’

Parallel Session F
Julia Peters (Bonn)
‘Aristotle on Habit and the Actual Soul’

11.45 David Allen (Warwick)
‘Deleuze and the Modalities of Philosophy’

Martin Christensen (Arhus)
‘Dewey on Actuality and Potentiality’

12.45 Conference ends.
David Allen (University of Warwick): Gilles Deleuze and the Modalities of Philosophy

In Deleuze’s work of the 1960s, the problem of philosophy – of its distinctive contribution to human life, of its future – is bound up with the question of how we are to situate philosophical practice in relation to certain modal concepts. Deleuze will criticise a range of philosophical approaches for entangling philosophy with questions of possibility, and correlative for conceiving of the necessity proper to philosophical thought in terms of its seizing something essential from this survey of possibilities. By contrast, Deleuze will seek to characterise a new practice of philosophical thought, gripped instead by a necessity that we might term vital, or existential, born of the contingency of a concrete situation in the context of which we are set to thinking by an encounter with something problematic and thus thought-provoking. Philosophy will no longer be a hypothetical rumination on possibilities detached from the life of the thinker, but a task of interpretation compelled by the troubling fascination of an elusive chance encounter.

Deleuze could be taken to develop a metaphysics of modality. However, in this paper I will be primarily concerned not so much with this metaphysics as with the way in which a rethinking of philosophy’s relation to certain modal concepts plays a role in Deleuze’s early metaphilosophical project – a project of reconstructing philosophy as what he terms ‘a thought without Image’. What is meant by ‘Image’ here – and, indeed, what is meant by ‘thought’ – will be of crucial importance in unravelling Deleuze’s distinctive approach to the questions of what philosophy is, what it’s for, and what it can do.

In approaching Deleuze’s early metaphilosophical project from this perspective, I hope not only to clarify this project – its character and stakes – but also to help to situate it, and thus Deleuze’s early thought more generally, within certain historical horizons. Firstly, bringing together these metaphilosophical questions in Deleuze’s early work with his rethinking of the role of modal notions helps us to clarify his place within a debate we find running throughout twentieth-century French philosophy: the attempt to negotiate between the demands of conceptual abstraction and the demands of ‘the concrete’. It is my
contention that Deleuze’s anti-phenomenological rhetoric in the 1960s has obscured the lingering impact on this period of his work of his youthful intellectual allegiance to existentialism, particularly to Sartre – a reappraisal of Deleuze’s meta-philosophical treatment of modal concepts will help to correct this. Secondly, reading Deleuze from this perspective allows us to resituate his work within the history, from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, of philosophy’s attempts to mark out a distinctive domain or approach for itself in contrast to the natural and social sciences. Deleuze’s seemingly free use of extra-philosophical materials, along with his distancing himself from any rhetoric pertaining to ‘the end of philosophy’, has, I argue, obscured the importance of the persistence of this problematic in his work. The approach taken in this paper will contribute to re-establishing this connection.
Martin Christensen (Aarhus Universitet): “Eliciting the possibilities interwoven within the texture of the actual”: John Dewey on Actuality and Potentiality

Throughout his mature philosophy the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952) was strongly inspired by British romantic poets such as Shelley and Keats and in particular by their conception of the imagination. This influence can be seen not only in his general understanding of the nature of philosophy but also more specifically in his reinterpretation of the classical Aristotelian concepts of actuality and potentiality. His philosophy may even be said to be a reinterpretation of Aristotelian philosophy in the light of such “romantic” insights as were articulated by the likes of Keats and Shelley. In this paper I will present an interpretation of this Deweyan understanding of actuality and potentiality.

The first part of the paper will give a sketch of the Aristotelian conceptions of actuality and potentiality and Dewey’s critique of these conceptions. As Dewey sees it, Aristotle’s ideas of potentiality and actuality are conceived in such a way that both individual things’ and the world’s potentialities are limited and fixed within certain pre-given bounds. Just like the potentialities of individual things are limited by their essential and fixed nature, so the potentialities of the universe are limited by its nature or essence and the universe itself is thought of as finished in the sense of rounded out and perfected. The main problem with this way of thinking, from a Deweyan perspective, is that history and experience seems to show that what Aristotle took to be the nature of different things and thus limiting their potentialities, was just a reflex of the customary ways of using things in Greek culture, so that Aristotle’s thinking about actuality and potentiality in the end served to justify and legitimize these specific, class-based, distinctions.

In the second part of the paper I will then present Dewey’s own reinterpretation of the concepts of actuality and potentiality and the way in which they relate to his understanding of the imagination. In accordance with his democratic faith Dewey thus reinterprets the idea of potentiality in such a way that a thing’s potentiality is not something that is fixed and inherent in the thing, but instead heavily dependent on the
thing’s relations and interactions. This means that a thing’s potentialities potentially becomes endless, since a thing may take part in a variety of interactions and sustain many different relations. In the same vein, the universe or nature is also reconceptualized as unfinished and in progress, and thus as having a large store of hidden and unrealized potentials.

In the final part of the paper I will briefly discuss how these ideas of potentiality and actuality relate to his idea of the imagination as the faculty that apprehends potentialities and possibilities. Because of his somewhat awkward position in the history of philosophy as an Hegelian-inspired American philosopher whose philosophy, despite enjoying widespread attention during his own life, went into relativ disrepute after his death, just to be “rediscovered” and “re-presented” to an American “analytic” audience by Richard Rorty in the 80’s and 90’s and more recently also by several “continental” philosophers, Dewey’s philosophy and in particular his understanding of actuality and potentiality seems to be a very interesting starting and meeting point for analytic and continental approaches to modality.
John Divers (University of Leeds), Necessity in Quine (and Thereafter)

Quine's attitude to necessity is often characterized as one of skepticism. One venerable response to skeptical positions is to attempt to make them implode by advancing one or other form of transcendental argument. There is a response to Quine's modal skepticism that appeals to such transcendental arguments.* In this paper, I construct this response as a transcendentalist response and evaluate its effectiveness against Quine's skeptical position.

Emma Ingala (Universidad Complutense de Madrid): Deleuze on Leibniz’s Vagabond Adam – From the Possible to the Virtual

With his notion of the virtual, Gilles Deleuze wants to avoid the consequences of the traditional conception of the possible, which Kant exemplarily framed in his critique of the ontological argument: the possible and the real or the actual share the same concept; that is, there is no conceptual difference whatsoever between the possible thing and the real thing, since the existence or being (that which the real thing would have as opposed to the possible) is not a real predicate (KrV A598/B626). This existence, however, would concede an ontological primacy to the real against the possible: ‘a hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers (...). My financial position is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them (that is of their possibility)’ (KrV A599/B626).

Deleuze inverts this hierarchy (the virtual is then ontologically prior) and rejects the argument that holds that the only difference between the possible and the real is that the real is given; for him, the virtual is no less real than the actual, and a fundamental difference separates them. Even if we cannot spend them, all the virtualities that go through a hundred possible thalers constitute the problematic sphere from where the decision on what to do with the real hundred thalers (and therefore what a hundred thalers are) emanates.

Following Deleuze’s own statements, the secondary literature usually links his construction of the virtual to Bergson and Proust, but we will pass through a different route, that of Leibniz’s conception of the possible, and stress its importance for Deleuze’s project, an importance seen from Deleuze’s unpublished courses on Leibniz.

According to his theory of the possible worlds, it is generally considered that Leibniz would fit in and agree with the Kantian description of the possible. However, Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz suggests his position is crucial to any attempt to overcome the traditional concept of possibility.
through the new notion of the virtual. The virtual as a problematic field (and therefore opposed to the possible, which is absolutely conceptually determined in the same way as reality is) can be already found in Leibniz: the possible thing no longer shares the concept with the actual one; it includes forking paths, has a potentiality and problematicity of which the actual thing lacks. Leibniz’s example of Adam is the paradigm of this conception: apart from the actual Adam (the one who sinned) there is a virtual or vague Adam, a problematic field constituted not by a series of determined possibilities given beforehand but by the infinity of singularities which will only be specified in the resolution of the problem. In the vague Adam there are several Adams, no decision is yet made about what Adam will actually be. ‘There is thus a “vague Adam”, that is, a vagabond, a nomad, an Adam = x common to several worlds’ (Logic of sense, p. 114).

We will therefore examine Leibniz’s conception of the possible and present it as the hinge that allows Deleuze to pass from the possible to the virtual. We will finish explaining the political implications of this transition.
Many late medieval thinkers, such as Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan, distanced themselves from traditional interpretations of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic and other received views of necessity and possibility. While the criticized modal paradigms, most typically the frequency model for necessity and possibility, were derived from ancient philosophy, the new conceptions associated with the idea of modality as alternativeness were for the most part medieval, first suggested by Abelard and some other twelfth-century figures and further developed in late medieval times, after thirteenth-century Aristotle reception. Some elements of late medieval modal insights were embedded in Leibniz’s philosophy of possible worlds and known through it, but otherwise these developments were hardly mentioned in philosophical works until the middle of the last century when many scholars began to investigate medieval logic and semantics, including modal logic and modal theories. This interest was stimulated by the lively discussion of modalities in the 60s and 70s and also, but not only, by the observation that, as distinct from ancient theories, there were some similarities between the philosophical assumptions of medieval theories and Kripkean possible worlds semantics. One of these was the association of the meaning of modal terms with the idea of simultaneous alternatives at the level of broadly metaphysical modalities.

I shall briefly describe the medieval uses of traditional modal theories and some innovations which did not exceed the limits of the extensional interpretation of modality, particularly in obligations logic and counterfactual thought experiments. After some remarks on the background of early medieval deviations from ancient modal theories, I shall discuss the basic assumptions of Scotus’s modal theory and their role in late medieval and early modern modal logic and metaphysics.
Mogens Laerke (ENS de Lyon/Aberdeen), The Great Confusion: Formal Essences and Actual Essences in Spinoza

Focus on the so-called PSR among US Spinozists, spearheaded by Michael Della Rocca, has had an interesting methodological corollary in analytical philosophy and in contemporary metaphysics in particular: a heightened respect for rationalism at the expense of lowered respect for pre-philosophical intuitions, and in particular for those intuitions that refer to common sense. Hence, when we go about our philosophizing we should constantly ‘check’ our rationally obtained conclusions against sets of pre-philosophical intuitions setting the limits for what will be considered acceptable. However, the agenda Della Rocca defends is opposed to this generally accepted ‘method of intuitions.’ The thing, of course, is that without any other guidance than this ‘reason’, we sometimes end up with some rather puzzling conclusions. Indeed, the general popularity of this new Spinoza-inspired radical rationalism has given rise to a whole interpretive culture, where this sort of conclusion is often welcomed rather than shunned, even among analytically minded Spinozists who are not per se passengers on the PSR-train. Unfortunately, the price of such ‘untaming’ of philosophy seems to be loss of understanding, because the conclusions reached may have been obtained in a rationally rigorous fashion, but do not make a whole lot of sense. I look here at an example where the exclusive concern for conceptual connections and disregard for other aspects of meaning-formation tends to lead to nonsense, and where accommodating, or checking against, certain seemingly non-conceptual aspects of meaning-formation may undeniably help to make better sense of Spinoza, making it hard to remain a hardline rationalist when it comes to interpretation. The example I will consider comes from another of the great analytical commentators, namely Don Garrett. Garrett is not a partisan of the PSR and the anti-intuitionist movement spearheaded by Della Rocca and Melamed. But I do think he has been somewhat smitten by the PSR movement when it comes to welcoming counter-intuitive conclusions, at least in the case I will consider here. It is taken from a paper written for the recent Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics edited by Olli Koistinen, and concerns Spinoza’s notions of formal essence and actual essence.
Jessica Leech (University of Sheffield): Kant on Intellectual Intuition and the Concept of Possibility

One striking contrast that Kant draws between the kind of cognitive capacities that humans have, and alternative kinds of intellect, concerns modal concepts. Whilst, ‘human understanding cannot avoid the necessity of drawing a distinction between the possibility and the actuality of things' (Kant 5:401), the very distinction between possibility and actuality would make no sense for an intuitive understanding. The aim of my talk is to explore in more detail how the functioning of these cognitive capacities relates to modal concepts, in order to draw some general lessons for our ability to make modal judgments, and the function of such judgments.
Stefan Leuenberger (Glasgow): Wolff on the Necessity of Necessity and the Necessity of Contingency

Early contributions to modal logic, following on from Aristotle, focussed on principles relating modal concepts to each other and to negation. In modern modal logic, such principles are typically taken for granted, and different systems differ from each other mainly in the principles governing iterations of modal operators. Today, philosophers typically take the soundness of the system S5 modal logic for granted, and hence accept that whatever is necessary is necessarily necessary, and that whatever is possible is necessarily possible. It was not always thus: the founder of modern logic, C.I. Lewis, rejected those principles. In the talk, I shall show that if we go back even further in history, we can find an early supporter of S5 – to put things anachronistically – in Christian Wolff.

The concept of possibility had a central place in Wolff's philosophy. He defined philosophy as “the science of all possible things, together with the manner and reason of their possibility.” He even made use of the concept of possibility in his analysis of existence, which he took to be the complement or fulfilment of possibility. To my knowledge, Wolff was also the first to explicitly put forward principles about the modal status of modal claims themselves (although iterations of epistemic operators had been considered by earlier authors). In his Latin Metaphysics (Ontologia) of 1730, he wrote that what is possible is necessarily possible, and that what is impossible is necessarily impossible. (He was somewhat less explicit in the German Metaphysics of 1719.)

Today, either possibility or necessity is typically taken as a primitive, for which axioms are to be laid down. Wolff – as Aristotle and Leibniz before him – takes possibility as defined in terms of the notion of a contradiction: something is possible if it does not involve a contradiction. Given this definition, the above principles about iterated modalities do not need to be taken as axiomatic. Rather, one can attempt to prove them from principles about the notion of involving a contradiction – a procedure analogous to one pursued by Timothy Williamson, who attempts to derive modal logic from a definition of
possibility as that which does not counterfactually imply a contradiction. Wolff did indeed put forward demonstrations of the two principles above. Given how difficult it is to reason about iterated modalities without the benefit of an adequate notation, it is perhaps unsurprising that these proofs do not stand up to scrutiny with modern tools. I shall show where they fail, and discuss whether they can be improved. Looking beyond the wording of the definition, I shall examine what might motivate the principles in the context of Wolff’s philosophy, and what role they play in his system.
John Maier (University of Cambridge): Sartre on Modality

Recent debates about modality have turned on a divide between those who wish to account for modality in terms of non-actual states of affairs and those who wish to account for modality in terms of immanent powers of actual beings. I consider a somewhat neglected attempt by Jean-Paul Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness*, to find a middle way between these views. He writes: In the everyday use we make of the possible, we can in no way apprehend it either as an aspect of our ignorance or as a non-contradictory structure belonging to a world not realized and at the margin of this world. The possible appears to us as a property of beings . . . [but] we are running the risk of letting these few remarks lead us to the Aristotelian “potentiality.” This would be to fall from Charybdis to Scylla, to avoid the purely logical conception of possibility only to fall into a magical conception. (*Being and Nothingness*, Part Two, Chapter One, Section Four) Sartre is concerned with the views of Leibniz on the one hand and those of Aristotle on the other, but his criticisms of these views, if sound, apply also to contemporary versions of the 'possible worlds' approach to modality and to contemporary 'neo-Aristotelian' approaches to modality, respectively. I explain what Sartre's criticisms of these views are, and outline his own proposed middle way between them. Having done this, I point out several virtues of the Sartrean view of modality, and discuss the prospects for its reconsideration in contemporary philosophy.
Anna Marmodoro (University of Oxford): Power Gunk

In this paper I investigate the foundations of Anaxagoras' metaphysics: the fundamental elements, their mixture, and the principles of causation, composition and division at play in his system. I conclude he endorses a novel type of gunk ontology.
Wayne Martin (University of Essex): The Semantics of ‘Dasein’ and the Modality of *Being and Time*

*Being and Time* is a methodologically complex work, combining hermeneutic, transcendental, phenomenological and ontological strategies in a provocative and not-obviously-stable concoction. I focus on one strand of the methodological puzzles raised by Heidegger’s undertaking: the problem of warranting the modal claims that occur frequently in the course of Heidegger’s project. In a number of crucial passages we are told that one or another trait of Dasein is necessary, or that some ontic feature of Dasein would not be possible, were it not for some deeper ontological feature. I undertake to determine the logical form of these doctrines, and to consider what kind of evidence might suffice to establish them. I draw on Heidegger’s complex debt to Dilthey in proposing an interpretation of the notion of an existeniale and I critically assess Taylor Carman’s recent treatment of Heidegger’s project as an extension of Kantian transcendental strategies. In the end, I argue, much comes to turn on one’s account of the semantics of Heidegger’s central term of art: ‘Dasein.’ I identify shortcomings in two possible approaches to this problem: one takes the extension of the term to be antecedently fixed, the other fixes the meaning of the term by specifying its intension. I then explore an alternative semantics for ‘Dasein’ under which the modalized doctrines of Being and Time can be considered de re necessities. All three of the semantic models that I consider remain highly schematic – cartoons rather than fully elaborated portraits – and I do not mean to suggest that any of the three would suffice to capture the enormously complex semantic structure of Heidegger’s undertaking. Nonetheless, I argue that the third semantic model enjoys certain demonstrable advantages over the other two, both for mounting a defense of Heidegger’s modal propositions, and as a schema for mapping the text of Being and Time. It also allows us to frame a challenge that any fully adequate semantic interpretation of Heidegger’s text would have to meet.
Chrissy Meijns (UCL): Actualised Essences

One of the central targets of disputation XXXI in Francisco Suárez’ *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597), is the idea that there is a real distinction between the essence (*essentia*) and existence (*existentia*) of any finite, created things—between what such a thing is, and that it is. That there is such a real distinction was put forward by, for example, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Aquinas and later Thomists. They were motivated by concerns about the contingency of the existence of created beings: for one, the metaphysical point that it is possible for created things not to exist; for another, the cognitive point that, with created things, whether they exist or not is not contained in the notion of their nature or essence (by grasping their nature, it is not thereby grasped whether or not they exist). The position Suárez develops here is first of all negative, as he wants to deny that there is a real distinction between the existence and essence of created things. But he equally puts forward a positive point, in two parts. First, that the sort of distinction that holds between the existence and essence of a created thing is one of reason only (*distictio rationis*), such that their separability is nothing but conceptual; second, that existence can be captured simply as an *actualisation* of essence. This last point may seem peculiar, because, different from authors like Aquinas, who accept both members of the act-potency pair as genuine, Suárez does not assign much reality to potential being at all, stating that an essence in potentiality is simply ‘nothing at all’ (*DM* XXXI.2). This paper concentrates on the role that Suárez’ specific take on the notions of act (*actus*) and potency (*potentia*) plays in his assessment of the distinction between essence and existence. It aims to establish two things. First, that for Suárez the account of act and potency, including the understanding of potential being as really ‘nothing’, is more basic and prior to considerations about essence and existence. Hence, it allows that there is a good basis for understanding Suárez’ account of existence as the being in act of essence, and his associated denial of a real distinction, against the background of his take on potency and act. If there is no way for something to be if not actual—where actual is understood as existing—then it makes sense to deny that essence and existence in any way really come apart. Nonetheless, it is argued secondly that the account of act
and potency that Suárez endorses does not strictly determine his rejection of a real distinction between the existence and the essence of created things. Taking the discussion of ‘being in intellect’ (esse in intellectu) as a case study, it is explicated how also independently of his account of act and potency, Suárez has the material to deny a real distinction.
Ohad Nachtomy (Fordham), Leibniz and Kant on Possibility and Existence

Kant’s famous point in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A599/B626) that existence is not a predicate is articulated in his early 1763 essay. In fact, the grounds for this claim have much deeper roots in the history of philosophy. It is strongly related to a notion of essence that is independent of existence, a view that itself has a long history. In this emerging picture, the notion of essence is understood in terms of pure logical possibility or, more precisely, in terms of consistent relations between concepts—relations that make no reference to existence. While the seeds of this conception had been germinating for a good few centuries (at least since Scotus), an explicit and influential identification of the essence of an individual with its complete concept or possibility was systematically developed and articulated by Leibniz.

Leibniz thus carried out the separation of essence from existence a long way. But he stopped short of God. For Leibniz, as for Descartes and Spinoza, essence and existence are conceptually related in the concept of God. Leibniz’s adherence to this privileged status of God’s existence has led Russell to observe that Leibniz equivocates on the notion of existence, namely, claiming that it is a predicate in the case of God (which he sees as a necessary being) but not as a predicate in the case of creatures (which he sees as contingent beings). Russell was right on this score. While Russell sees this equivocation as pointing to an inconsistency in Leibniz, I will use Russell’s observation for highlighting one of Leibniz’s deep metaphysical commitments, showing why he was not prepared to generalize this point, and why Kant was.

Arguably, Leibniz’s reasons for stopping at God are, in the end, his deep religious and theological commitments. As I will point out, however, interwoven with his theological concerns, Leibniz had deep philosophical reasons for maintaining this position. As it turns out, some of these reasons (especially that the possible presupposes something actual) are taken up in Kant’s essay of 1763, where he is already endorsing the view that existence is not a predicate.
This is not to say that Leibniz’s twofold notion of existence does not generate a severe tension. Rather, the main point of this paper is precisely to show that the tension between these notions of existence and the notion of logical possibility lead Kant to generalize the view of existence, so that existence need not be seen as a predicate at all. This was no doubt a significant revolution in philosophy. As I will point out, this Kantian revolution, however, was a culmination of an enormously complex evolution in which Leibniz’s view of possibility plays an important role.

Indeed, any attempt to generalize the Leibnizian view that existence is not an essential predicate of created things would have to confront the intrinsic connection Leibniz supposes between essence and existence in the concept of God. In addition, any attempt at such a generalization would have to reconsider, if not revise, the indispensable role God’s understanding plays in Leibniz’s modal system. As it turns out, this is precisely what Kant does in his *Critique of Pure Reason* in which he argues that *a priori* proofs (from concepts alone) for existence claims in general (and for God’s existence in particular) are impossible. Likewise, in his critical period, Kant is placing the conception of possibilities not in God’s understanding, as Leibniz does, but in the human understanding. According to Kant in the first Critique, the empirical content available to the human understanding is constrained by its subjective conditions of sensibility. These conditions, in turn, constrain human judgment about both possibility and existence. The focus of the present paper, however, is the role Leibniz plays in this complex development.
Julia Peters (Bonn): Hegel on Habit and the Actual Soul

In his *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Hegel acknowledges in several places that his philosophy of mind is indebted to Aristotle in crucial respects. However, Hegel offers only little in the way of an explicit discussion of the precise sense in which his philosophy of mind is close to Aristotle’s.

I try to show in this paper that Hegel, like Aristotle, develops a conception of the soul which is neither dualistic nor materialistic: In the soul, according to Hegel, mind and natural body – or inner and outer, as he also calls it – are identical, while remaining at the same time distinguishable. The soul thereby constitutes a paradigmatic instance of Hegel’s conception of speculative identity. It is in virtue of constituting such an identity that the soul is fully actual – *wirklich* – Hegel argues: On the one hand, it is not merely inward or subjective, but has objective, external existence. On the other hand, it does not merely exist as an external particular, but possesses a universal, inner concept that manifests itself in its externality and underlies its persistence (this is the equivalent to the Aristotelian notion of form). In this way, Hegel’s conception of the actual soul illuminates his notion of actuality as an identity of inner and outer.

However, unlike Aristotle, Hegel holds that *habit* plays a crucial role in the constitution of the soul: It is only through the acquisition of habits – in particular, habits involving bodily movements – that the soul becomes actual and hence that the identity of mind and natural body emerges. In the paper, I explicate how the acquisition of habits brings it about that the soul becomes actual on Hegel’s account.

A key idea of Hegel here is that repetition, as the power which generates habits, possesses a transformative potential. Thus bodily movements which are repeated to the extent that they become habitual are transformed in such a way that they come to be immediately perceived, by the subject who possesses the habit, as unified and universal rather than 2 separate and particular. For Hegel, this unification and universalization of bodily movements is at the same time a process of appropriation of the body: The subject who has developed
bodily habits can conceive of the body as its own, or conceive of itself as embodied.

Moreover, in addition to this phenomenological sense, the repetition of bodily movements, in generating habit, brings about the identity of mind and natural body in a metaphysical sense on Hegel’s account. In contrast to other dispositions, which may or may not manifest themselves, habits are constituted by their repeated manifestation. Hence once a bodily habit has been acquired, the soul has been brought into existence as a universal form which is constituted by its particular bodily manifestations. In this sense, as a bearer of habits, the soul can be understood as an inner which is identical with its external manifestation.
Sarah Rossiter (Ontario): Bradwardine on Future Contingents

Thomas Bradwardine’s *De futuris contingentibus* presents an original account of future contingents in opposition to that of William Ockham. The problem for both thinkers, of course, is how to go about reconciling God's foreknowledge with the real contingency of future events. According to Ockham's highly influential account, this is possible because although God has knowledge *in the present* of future contingent events, the fact that the subject matter of that knowledge is future and contingent makes the knowledge itself future and contingent in some special sense; thus, Ockham denies that the sort of inferences we may make about the necessity inhering in present events can in any way apply to God's present knowledge of things future, or in turn to the objects of that knowledge. Bradwardine is not satisfied with this solution, which he considers to be incompatible with divine immutability, and instead proposes a solution resting on the distinction between *absolute* and *ordered* (or ordained – *ordinata*) power.

Bradwardine argues that God's knowledge of future events is enacted by his *ordered* power, and that *relative* to this power, the events of his knowledge are indeed necessary; however, this relative necessity says nothing of the events' absolute necessity. So Bradwardine employs Boethius' distinction between conditional and absolute necessity: but what makes his account markedly original and significant is the added distinction between God's absolute and ordered power.

Surprisingly, Bradwardine's *De futuris contingentibus* has received almost no scholarly attention. In 1979, Jean-François Genest produced an edited text of the treatise; however, apart from Genest's introduction to the text, I can find no published treatment of this fascinating work. Before his death, Norman Kretzmann began translating portions of Bradwardine's treatise into English (copies of this have circulated in unpublished form), but this project was never completed, and Kretzmann never wrote anything else on the topic. What I therefore intend to achieve in this paper is an entirely original presentation of Bradwardine's account of future contingents, highlighting his criticism of Ockham and his divergence from other previous accounts.
Peter Simons (Trinity College Dublin): And Now for Something Completely Different: Meinong’s Approach to Modality

In the twentieth century three approaches to modality dominated. One denied its legitimacy (Russell, Quine). A second made language the source of modality (Carnap). The third treats possible worlds as the source of truth for modal propositions (Kripke, Lewis et al.). Meinong's account of modality is quite different from all of these. Like the last it has an ontological basis, but it eschews worlds in favour of a rich one-world ontology of objects and states of affairs, many of which notoriously fail to exist and some even more notoriously fail to be possible. We lay out the ontological basis of Meinong's system and show how he accommodates standard modal notions. Two peculiarities of his system are then investigated: his preference of possibility over necessity, and his treatment of degrees of possibility, which allows him to subsume probability theory in his account.
Ugo Zilioli (University of Pisa): Capacity and Actuality in Aristotle
Metaphysics Theta 3: a Philosophical Defence of the Megarians

In one of the most philosophically rewarding passages on possibility and actuality in the whole of Greek philosophy, that is, *Metaphysics* Theta 3, Aristotle considers a view on actuality, to be attributed to some Megarian philosophers, which he aims to show to be untenable. According to this Megarian view, “something is capable only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it is not capable: For example, someone who is not building is not capable of building, but someone who is building is capable to do so when he is building; and likewise too in other cases” (Theta 3, 1046b30-3). Aristotle maintains that from this view equating capacity and actuality, absurd consequences follow. Among these, there are the following ones: 1) the impossibility to account for craft capacities (1046b33-1047a4); 2) things are just and only as they are perceived to be (in this sense, the adherents of this Megarian view on actuality have to share Protagoras’ relativist doctrine of perception) (1047a4-7); 3) the very impossibility of perception, on the grounds that people plainly retain the capacity of perceiving even when they are not doing so (1047a7-10); 4) the impossibility of change, in so far as the Megarians are committed to holding that if someone ever exercises a capacity, then she will always exercise that capacity (1047a10-7).

By relying on recent scholarly attempts aimed to clarify and assess the plausibility of Aristotle’s objections, such as Makin 2006 and Beere 2009, I will argue that Aristotle’s critique fails in many points (in particular, objections 1-3 have a rather straightforward way out, while objection 4 could be avoided with a bit of hard work). In the end, a coherent view on actuality could well be attributed to the Megarians—and that coherent view could find a philosophical analogue in a section of Plato’s *Theaetetus* (156a-d & 159a-160c), where Socrates is made to speak at length of active and passive factors while elaborating an original theory of actuality.
Campus Map: the Berrick Saul Building

Getting to the Humanities Research Centre

The Humanities Research Centre is located with the Berrick Saul Building, a spectacular new structure at the heart of the Heslington West campus.

The Building can be easily reached by public transport: the no. 4 bus runs from the railway station to the campus via the city centre every ten to fifteen minutes: please alight at the Morrell Library stop, and walk towards the Market Square from which you will see signs to the Building.

Parking is available less than five minutes’ walk from the HRC in Campus Central Car Park; visitors with mobility difficulties can drive or be dropped off at the door of the Berrick Saul building, in which the HRC is located. The building is fully accessible for disabled visitors.
Directions to King's Manor (Conference Dinner)

The King’s Manor is situated in Exhibition Square, next to the City Art Gallery (to the left of the Gallery when in front of it), across the road from the Theatre Royal, near to the Minster and a few minutes on foot from the centre of York.

The postcode of The Kings Manor is YO1 7EP.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy is the journal of the British Society for the History of Philosophy. It publishes articles and reviews on the history of philosophy from antiquity to the end of the twentieth century. The journal is designed to foster understanding of the history of philosophy through studying the writings of past philosophers in their context and with sensitivity to issues of philosophical argumentation and historical development. Although it focuses on the recognized classics, the journal gives attention to less major figures and to influences and relationships that are often overlooked. Articles cover the history of European philosophy.

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